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	What	 can	 make	 storytelling	 “evil”	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 the	storytelling	leads	to	accepting	a	view	for	no	good	reason,	thus	allowing	 ill-reasoned	 action?	 I	 mean	 the	 storytelling	 can	 be	argumentatively	evil,	not	trivially	that	(e.g.)	the	overt	speeches	of	characters	can	include	bad	arguments.	My	thesis	is	that	for	fictional	narratives,	 the	 shorter	 the	narrative,	 the	greater	 the	potential	 for	 argumentative	 evil.	 In	 other	 argumentative	contexts,	 length	 generally	 appears	 to	 make	 no	 comparable	difference.		 KEYWORDS:	 advertisements,	 anecdotal	 arguments,	believability,	 fables,	 narrative	 argument,	 parables,	 thought	experiments,	transcendental	argument,	truth	in	fiction			1.	INTRODUCTION		What	can	make	storytelling	“evil”	in	the	sense	that	the	storytelling	leads	to	 accepting	 a	 view	 or	message	 for	 no	 good	 reason,	 thus	 allowing	 ill-reasoned	action?	The	general	idea	that	storytelling	can	have	pernicious	effects	 on	 practical	 reasoning	 goes	 back,	 of	 course,	 at	 least	 as	 far	 as	Plato.	My	point	 is	 that	 the	storytelling	can	be	argumentatively	evil,	not	trivially	 that	 (e.g.)	 the	 overt	 speeches	 of	 characters	 can	 include	 bad	arguments.	 The	 storytelling	 can	 be	 argumentatively	 evil	 in	 that	 it	purveys	 false	 premises,	 or	 purveys	 reasoning	 that	 is	 formally	 or	informally	 fallacious.	 The	main	 thesis	 of	 this	 paper	 is	 that	 there	 is	 an	aspect	 involving	 the	 very	 form	 of	 fictional	 narratives,	 namely,	 their	length,	 that	 can	 distinctively	 allow	 a	 narrative	 to	 be	 evil	 in	 the	 sense	indicated.	As	 a	 rule,	 the	 shorter	 the	 fictional	narrative,	 the	 greater	 the	potential	 for	 argumentative	 evil.	 Here,	 the	 notion	 of	 length	 is	 to	 be	understood	such	that	 it	 is	generally	a	proxy	 for	more	abstract	 features	such	 as	 how	 complex	 and	 nuanced	 the	 piece	 is.	 In	 argumentative	contexts	other	than	those	involving	fictional	narrative,	length	generally	
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617	being	a	fable”	(2009,	p.	381).	However,	it	does	seem	that	longer	fictional	narratives	need	not	have	a	point,	whether	implicit	or	explicit—consider	the	recent	U.S.	television	series	Lost	and	perhaps	James	Joyce’s	Ulysses—and	even	that	 they	are	 less	 literary	 if	 they	do	have	a	point	or	moralize	(cf.	Hunt,	p.	382).	“A	novel	or	theater	piece	need	not	reach	a	conclusion	or	 even	 seem	 to	 approach	 one”	 (Velleman,	 2003,	 p.	 10).	 Currie	 (2010,	pp.	34-35)	offers	a	kind	of	explanation	of	this	difference.	He	says	that	if	you	 are	 distinguishing	 narrative	 from	 something	 on	 the	 order	 of	mathematical	 physics,	 no	 doubt	 parables	 and	 the	 like	 count	 as	narratives.	 But	 if	 you	have	 in	mind	 something	 on	 the	 order	 of	 a	 short	story	or	novel,	you	might	distinguish	narratives	 from	parables	and	the	like,	because	the	latter	“have	generalizing	tendencies	that	do	not	fit	well	with	the	particularizing,	sequential	aspirations	of	narrative.”	Before	developing	 some	of	 these	 ideas	 further,	 let	us	put	 some	illustrations	on	the	table.	Here	is	an	example	of	an	ad	(from	television):		
Copy	 and	 gist	 from:	 Think	 small.	 The	 story	 of	 those	 Vehicle	
ads,	 by	 Frank	 Rowsome,	 Jr.,	 1970,	 pg.	 116-7.	 The	 company	name	 is	 changed	 here.	 Visual	 description	 more	 or	 less	 by:	Shazam	(Suzanne).	___________________________________________________		[Dark	 snowy	 early	 morning	 in	 country,	 view	 is	 of	 outdoors	through	 the	 front	 windshield	 of	 a	 car.	 The	 car's	 headlights	illuminate	 the	 falling	 snow,	 and	 the	 drifts	 of	 it,	 along	 the	untracked,	 winding,	 uphill	 way,	 and	 you	 can	 see,	 in	 passing,	snow	laden	pine	and	fir	branches,	bent	under	the	weight	of	the	snow.	 The	 only	 sound	 throughout:	 the	 purring	 of	 the	 car's	engine.	This	trip	takes	some	time.]		[Then	 the	 headlights	 hit	 and	 pass	 a…building,	 the	 driver	turning	 the	 car	by	 it.	The	 car	 gets	parked:	 the	headlights	 are	turned	 off.	 A	 big	 door	 of	 the	 building	 soon	 opens	 and	 a	powerful	 snowplow	 rolls	 past	 our	 view	 as	 the	 ANNOUNCER	begins.]		ANNOUNCER	Have	 you	 ever	 wondered	 how	 the	 man	 who	 drives	 the	snowplow	drives	to	the	snowplow?	This	one	drives	a	Vehicle.	So	you	can	stop	wondering.	_____________________________________________________		Note:	This	commercial	was	so	popular	in	Florida	and	Southern	California	that	some	stations	played	it	over	and	over	again	due	to	audience	requests.	
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618	(http://reocities.com/tvtranscripts/comm/commcar.htm;	 accessed	 on	 9	Feb.	2015).	Here	is	an	example	of	a	fable	(from	Aesop):		 The	Eagle	and	the	Arrow	An	Eagle	was	soaring	through	the	air	when	suddenly	it	heard	the	whizz	of	an	Arrow,	and	felt	itself	wounded	to	death.	Slowly	it	fluttered	down	to	the	earth,	with	its	life-blood	pouring	out	of	it.	 Looking	 down	 upon	 the	 Arrow	 with	 which	 it	 had	 been	pierced,	 it	 found	 that	 the	 shaft	 of	 the	 Arrow	 had	 been	feathered	 with	 one	 of	 its	 own	 plumes.	 “Alas!”	 it	 cried,	 as	 it	died,	 “we	 often	 give	 our	 enemies	 the	 means	 for	 our	 own	destruction.”		(http://www.aesopfables.com/cgi/aesop1.cgi?1&TheEagleandtheArrow2;	accessed	on	15	Feb.	2015).	And	finally,	a	Ramakrishna	parable:		 WHAT	YOU	ARE	AFTER,	IS	WITHIN	YOURSELF	A	MAN	wanted	 a	 smoke.	 He	went	 to	 a	 neighbour's	 house	 to	light	his	charcoal.	 It	was	the	dead	of	night	and	the	household	was	asleep.	After	he	had	knocked	a	great	deal,	someone	came	down	 to	open	 the	door.	At	 sight	of	 the	man	he	asked,	 “Hello!	What’s	 the	matter?”	 The	man	 replied,	 “Can't	 you	 guess?	 You	know	how	fond	I	am	of	smoking.	I	have	come	here	to	light	my	charcoal.”	 The	 neighbour	 said,	 “Ha!	 Ha!	 You	 are	 a	 fine	 man	indeed!	You	took	the	trouble	to	come	and	do	all	this	knocking	at	the	door!	Why,	you	have	a	lighted	lantern	in	your	hand!”	What	 a	 man	 seeks	 is	 very	 near	 him.	 Still	 he	 wanders	 about	from	place	to	place.		(p.	350	of	a	PDF	book,	Tales	and	Parables	of	Sri	Ramakrishna,	at:	




619	could	 be	 a	 story;	 Velleman	 proposes	 that	 it	 is	 notably	 because	 “the	sequence	of	events	completes	an	emotional	cadence	in	the	audience”	of	“indignation	gratified.”	Velleman	argues	that	the	trouble	is	that	through	experiencing	 a	 story’s	 emotional	 resolution,	 events	 become	understandable	 to	 an	 audience	 not	 through	 assimilation	 to	 “familiar	patterns	 of	 how	 things	 happen,	 but	 rather	 to	 familiar	 patterns	 of	 how	
things	 feel”	(p.	19).	The	 latter,	subjective	understanding	can	easily	give	us	a	false	sense	of	objective	understanding,	so	skepticism	about	what	a	story	claims	or	about	its	message	might	be	mistakenly	dispelled.	Hence,	“telling	a	story	is	often	a	means	to	being	believed	for	no	good	reason”	(p.	22),	thereby	introducing	argumentative	evil.	Velleman’s	 theory	 appears	 to	 apply	 nicely	 to	 the	 examples	quoted	 above.	 Certainly,	 at	 least	 curiosity	 satisfied	 plays	 a	 role	 in	 the	vivid	 “Vehicle”	 commercial	 by	 the	 time	 the	 announcer’s	 voiceover	 is	reached	 and	 suggests	 a	 generalization.	The	Aesop	 fable	 closes	with	 an	explanation/generalization	that	is	a	surprise	ending	to	a	 life-and-death	tale.	 The	 Ramakrishna	 parable	 involves	 a	 breathtaking	 generalization	leap,	 as	 well	 as	 some	 humor.	 However,	 it	 is	 not	 at	 all	 clear	 that	 the	theory	applies	to	longer	literary	genres	where	the	piece	does	not	have	a	succinct	point,	message,	moral,	or	conclusion—for	these	are	what	pack	the	 punch	 or	 drive	 the	 “emotional	 resolution.”	 	 One	 may	 of	 course	engage	emotionally	with	the	meaning	of	a	piece	of	substantial	literature	such	as	a	play	or	novel,	but	to	the	extent	that	its	meaning	is	complex	or	nuanced,	 it	 is	 unlikely	 that	 there	 will	 be	 any	 definitive—let	 alone	global—emotional	resolution	(hence	there	may	be	a	sequel	that	simply	continues	the	story).	About	such	genres	Velleman	says	“they	tend	to	be	described	 as	 genres	 of	 narrative	 by	 extension”	 (p.	 17;	 cf.	 10),	 but	 it	 is	more	 plausible	 to	 hold	 that	 as	 a	 theory	 of	 all	 narrative,	 his	 theory	overreaches.	If	anything,	it	is	the	shortest	genres	that	are	narratives	by	extension,	as	Currie	suggests	above.	So,	I	think	we	see	here	one	way	in	which	shorter	narratives	have	a	greater	potential	for	argumentative	evil	than	longer	ones.	In	 his	 discussion,	 Velleman	 does	 not	 distinguish	 between	fictional	 and	 nonfictional	 narration,	 but	 on	 his	 own	 theory	 you	would	think	 that	 the	 potential	 for	 argumentative	 evil	 is	 less	 for	 nonfictional	narration	 since	 by	 definition	 it	 aims	 at	 veracity	 or	 telling	 how	 things	
actually	 happened.	 The	 proper	 purpose	 of	 any	 nonfictional	 narrative	argument	 is	 to	 be	 sound	 in	 the	 respect	 of	 having	 true	 premises,	 in	contrast	to	the	generalizing	ad,	fable,	and	parable	fictions	quoted	above,	for	example.					
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620	3.	BELIEVABILITY			On	 the	 continuum	 of	 fictional	 narrative,	 if	 you	 move	 in	 the	 direction	from	 ads	 to	 novels,	 an	 interesting	 feature	 seems	 to	 be	 that—not	immediately	 but	 somewhere	 fairly	 early	 on—believability	 becomes	 a	central	criterion	of	assessment.	 Is	 the	piece	successful	 “make-believe”?	This	 question	 hardly	 pertains	 to	 shorter	 fictional	 narratives;	 it	 is	 not	really	 the	 “game”	 in	 play	 or	 an	 appropriate	 standard	 to	 apply.	 Rather,	such	 narratives	 aim	 at	 being	 charming	 or	 arresting,	 and	 especially	 at	being	moving	through	the	emotional	resolution	packed	by	their	point	or	message.	 But	 whatever	 they	 aim	 at,	 it	 seems	 that	 the	 question	 of	believability	 must	 be	 bracketed	 or	 suspended	 for	 shorter	 fictional	narratives	essentially	because	there	is	too	little	room	provided	in	such	a	piece	to	adequately	test	out	the	hypothesis	that	it	is	believable.	I	 don’t	mean	 “believability”	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 artifices	 of	magic	such	 as	 talking	 animals	 or	 objects,	 as	 are	 common	 in	 fables,	 would	preclude	 it.	 For	 short	 genres,	 these	 are	 established	 conventions	 of	expedience	 and	 other	 purposes	 (see	 Olmos,	 2014);	 there	 is	 no	presumption	that	the	author	should	even	acknowledge	deviations	from	accepted	 science,	 let	 alone	 try	 to	 explain	 or	 invent	 any	 underlying	physics.	 In	 contrast,	 there	 is	 this	 presumption	 for	 extended	 science	fiction	 or	 fantasy	 narratives,	 and	 if	 they	 do	 not	 conform	 to	 our	 most	fundamental	 shared	 assumptions	 about	 physical	 reality,	 their	believability	 in	 the	 intended	 sense	 is	 indeed	 called	 into	 question	 (a	possible	example	 is	H.	P.	Lovecraft’s	novella	The	Call	of	Cthulhu).	More	generally,	believability	seems	to	be	determined	mostly	by	what	can	be	called	the	“internal”	and	“external”	coherence	of	the	event	complex	of	an	extended	 fictional	 narrative.	 I	 take	 Schultz	 (1979,	 p.	 233)	 to	 be	succinctly	 explicating	 internal	 coherence	 where	 he	 says:	 “the	 events	must	be	motivated	in	terms	of	one	another…either	one	event	is	a	causal	(or	 otherwise	 probable)	 consequence	 of	 another;	 or	 some	 event’s	happening	 provides	 a	 character	 with	 a	 reason	 or	 motive	 for	 making	another	event	happen”	(cf.,	e.g.,	Cebik,	1971,	p.	16).	The	narrative	is	not	believable	if	in	it	things	keep	happening	for	no	apparent	reason	or	in	a	way	 that	 is	 inadequately	 connected	 with	 the	 other	 events	 in	 the	narrative.	Certainly,	 this	applies	 to	some	degree	 to	William	Burroughs’	




621	cohere	 well	 with	 our	 widely	 shared	 basic	 assumptions	 about	 how	human	psychology	and	society	not	only	actually,	but	necessarily	work.	This	 is	 the	main	component	of	external	coherence.	The	believability	of	an	extended	fictional	narrative	requires	that	its	plot,	characters,	and	fine	description	 be	 developed	 in	 ways	 that	 generally	 conform	 to	 our	fundamental	 shared	 assumptions	 about	 human	 nature	 (Max	Beerbohm’s	Zuleika	Dobson	seems	to	fully	recognize	this	requirement	in	its	 intentional	 violation	 of	 it1),	 and	 secondarily,	 about	 physical	 nature	(as	noted).	Of	 course,	 the	 believability	 of	 an	 extended	 fictional	 narrative	does	 not	 involve	 believing	 that	 its	 event	 complex	 is	 true;	 rather,	 it	involves	 believing	 that	 the	 event	 complex	 could	 have	 been	 true	 in	 a	strong	sense	of	“could”—much	stronger,	for	example,	than	that	of	mere	logical	possibility.	The	possibilities	 that	 the	narrative	evokes,	 if	 it	 is	 to	be	 believable,	must	 be	 grounded	 in	 “real”	 event	 relations	 and	 in	 basic	perceived	 facts	 of	 human	 nature.	 And	 as	 the	 narrative	 progresses	 in	developing	a	 theme(s),	 the	possibilities	 evoked	must	be	 salient	 in	 that	they	 are	 thematically	 relevant.	 But	 the	 shorter	 the	 fictional	 narrative,	the	 closer	 the	 possibilities	 come	 to	 being	mere	 logical	 possibilities.	 In	the	 shortest,	 there	 is	 almost	no	plot	or	 character	development,	 or	 fine	description.	 So	 there	 is	 no	 way	 to	 tell	 if	 the	 narrative	 is	 significantly	internally	or	externally	coherent.2	It	 seems	 that	 generally,	 believability	 is	 experienced	 by	 the	audience	 as	 a	 simple,	 unanalyzed	 datum	 or	measure	 of	 the	 narrative,	continuously	updated	as	the	audience	progresses	through	the	work	and	imaginatively	 engages	with	 it.	 And,	 as	Aristotle	 said	 about	 judging	 the	
																																								 																					1Consider	 this	 description	 of	 the	 novel:	 “…an	 ironic	 fantasy	 of	 Oxford	undergraduate	 life	a	100	or	so	years	ago.	The	characters’	speech	and	motives	are	absurd	in	about	equal	measure,	but	one	would	be	missing	the	point	to	hold	this	 against	 the	 work.	 For	 the	 author	 is	 plainly	 not	 seeking	 psychological	verisimilitude…The	 interest	 of	 the	work	 is	 essentially	 that	 of	 a	 tour	 de	 force:	how	 long	 can	 the	 author	 retain	 our	 interest	 while	 so	 consciously	 eschewing	psychological	plausibility?”	(Currie,	2012,	p.	29	&	n.	7).	2Being	believable	does	not	mean	that	something	is	on	its	way	to	being	believed,	for	that	path	is	never	taken	for	something	you	know	to	be	fiction.	With	respect	to	 fictional	stories,	 internal	and	external	coherence	constitute	more	or	 less	all	there	 is	 to	believability;	with	respect	to	nonfictional	stories,	belief	may	be	the	only	thing	there	is	to	believability	(possibility	is	logically	implied	by	actuality).	Hence,	 it	 is	 problematic	 to	 analyze	 “believability”	 (“credibility,”	 “plausibility”)	indifferently	as	it	pertains	to	these	two	story	domains,	as	do	Fisher	(1987)	and	Olmos	(2013;	2015).	
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623	narratives.	This	subject	matter	 is	basically	human	nature,	 I	 take	it.	The	inner	and	outer	worlds	of	 the	narrative	argument	are	 significantly	 the	same;		it	is	not	as	if	the	worlds	are	distinct	as,	for	example,	thought	and	a	brain	 in	 a	 vat,	 as	 in	 Putnam’s	 memorable	 transcendental	 argument	(1981,	 Ch.	 1).	 And,	 as	 Nagel	 (1979,	 Ch.	 12)	 forcefully	 argued,	 because	after	all	we	are	human,	we	know	what	it	is	like	to	be	human	in	a	way	we	do	not	know	what	it	is	like	to	have	a	different	nature,	such	as	a	bat’s	(and	perceive	the	world	primarily	through	echolocation,	be	capable	of	flying,	etc.).	 Such	 philosophical	 considerations	 indicate	 that	 the	 principles	evoked	 in	 the	 narrative	 argument	 resonate	 in	 believability	 largely	because	they	are	true	of	human	nature.		As	we’ve	 seen,	 storytelling	 ads	 and	 jokes,	 and	 short	 fables	 and	parables,	 may	 be	 charming	 or	 arresting.	 But	 this	 affective	 appeal	especially	 allows	 them	 also	 to	 be	 seductive	 and	 possibly	 misleading	since	they	have	a	point	or	message.	One	can	be	seduced	into	accepting	the	message	for	no	good	reason	and	acting	on	it,	 for	instance,	buying	a	“Vehicle”	 even	 though	 you	 live	 in	 Florida.	 My	 key	 point	 is	 that	 such	perniciousness	 does	 not	 apply	 to	 longer	 fictional	 narratives	 that	 are	believable,	 insofar	 as	 believability	 implicates	 truths	 of	 human	 nature,	even	 though	 longer	 fictional	narratives	 in	some	ways	have	as	much	or	more	 affective	 appeal.	 Only	 fictional	 narratives	 that	 are	 believable	exhibit	 (indirectly,	 and	 as	 wholes)	 the	 distinctive	 narrative	 argument	form	outlined	above.	This	form	is	not	only	valid	but	is	in	a	certain	way	probabilistically	 sound.	 (1)-(3)	 constitute	 a	 schematic	 meta-level	representation	 of	 the	 (transcendental)	 argument	 of	 a	 believable	 story,	which,	 at	 the	 object	 level,	 is	 only	 indirectly	 expressed	by	 the	 story.	At	the	object	level,	given	that	premise	(1)	is	true	and	that	our	fundamental	shared	conceptions	of	human	nature	are	generally	true,	 the	conclusion	(3)	 is	unlikely	 to	be	mistaken.	However,	at	 the	 interpretive	meta-level,	perhaps	 especially	 where	 the	 literary	 critic	 attempts	 to	 directly	 state	which	 specific	 truths	 of	 human	 nature	 are	 implicated	 (i.e.,	 flesh	 out	premise	 (2)),	 no	 doubt	 errors	 may	 be	 committed.	 Nevertheless,	 this	interpretive	enterprise	is	worth	pursuing,	for	it	articulates,	insofar	as	it	is	successful,	the	narrative’s	contribution	to	human	knowledge.	Through	the	transcendental	argument	and	the	“work”	of	progressing	through	the	narrative,	 true	assumptions	or	conceptions	held	by	the	audience	about	human	nature	become	justified	true	beliefs.		Thus,	 as	 compared	 to	 shorter	 fictional	 narratives,	 longer	 ones	that	 are	 believable	 have	 less	 potential	 for	 argumentative	 evil	 in	 the	respect	 that	 their	 believability	 generates	 a	 good	 transcendental	argument.	 This	 is	 not	 to	 deny	 that	 there	 are	 other	 respects	 in	 which	extended	 fictional	 narratives,	 whether	 believable	 or	 not,	 may	 be	 evil.	Some	 of	 these	 respects	 have	 nothing	 to	 do	 with	 argument,	 and	 some	
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Jones,	the	story	of	the	wronged	Prodigious	Son	and	the	father	who	must	in	the	end	seek	forgiveness.		4.	OTHER	(IL)LOGIC	OF	SHORT	FICTIONS		In	 contrast	 to	 believable	 fictions,	 storytelling	 ads,	 jokes,	 fables,	 and	parables,	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 they	 are	 argumentative,	 do	 not	 exhibit	 a	distinctive	narrative	argument	 form,	but	rather	exhibit	standard	 forms	such	 as	 argument	 from	 analogy	 and	 inductive	 generalization.	 At	 least	partly	 because	 of	 the	 heavy	 reliance	 of	 such	 arguments	 on	 affective	appeal	 when	 expressed	 by	 such	 fictional	 narratives,	 unsurprisingly,	Govier	&	Ayers	 (2012,	 p.	 188)	 found	 that	 these	 “arguments	 are	 rarely	cogent,”	and	(echoing	Velleman)	“the	form	and	interest	of	the	story	will	often	 distract	 us	 from	 attempting	 any	 task	 of	 logical	 assessment.”	 For	example,	 they	point	out	 that	 the	parable	above,	What	You	are	After,	 is	Within	 Yourself,	 taken	 as	 an	 argument,	 involves	 “hastily	 generalizing	from	the	highly	specific	situation	of	a	man	wandering	about	in	the	dark,	with	 a	 lighted	 lantern,	 to	 a	 universal	 human	 quest”	 (p.	 178).	 Not	 to	mention,	 let	 us	 not	 forget,	 the	 single	 instance	 on	 which	 the	generalization	is	based	is	fictional.	Similarly,	 the	 conclusion	 in	 The	 Eagle	 and	 the	 Arrow	 that	 “we	often	give	our	enemies	 the	means	 for	our	own	destruction,”	 taking	the	fable	as	an	argument,	is	an	unjustified	leap,	although	it	is	more	guarded.	Understood	 as	 an	 argument,	 the	 fable	 seems	 best	 understood	 as	 an	argument	 from	 analogy.	 Certainly,	 the	 source	 and	 target	 domains	 are	distinct	 but	 parallel4—the	 fabulous	 world	 of	 talking	 and	 reasoning	animals,	 and	 the	 human	 world,	 respectively.	 The	 use	 of	 an	 eagle	 in	particular,	 might	 allude	 to	 a	 human	 type	 or	 stereotype	 (a	 smart	 and	successful	but	overly	trusting	“high-flyer”)	particularly	subject	to	such	a	plight.	 The	 case	 seems	 to	 fit	 Hunt’s	 (2009)	 analysis	 of	 fabulous	arguments	from	analogy:	they	have	a	“first	case/principle/second	case”	structure,	where	the	principle	is	in	Peircean	fashion	“abduced”	from	the	first	case	(the	eagle’s	plight)—the	principle	“is	supported	to	the	extent	that	it	is	a	good	explanation	of	the	first	case.”	The	second	case,	however,	is	 deduced	 from	 the	 principle	 (p.	 373);	 it	 is	 how	 readers	 apply	 the	principle	 “to	 guide	 their	 own	 moral	 conduct	 or	 persuade	 others”	 (p.	379)—as	one	might	think,	“I	better	be	careful	or	there	 is	a	real	chance	that	I	could	inadvertently	help	my	rivals	by…”																																									 																					4For	the	importance	in	drawing	an	analogy	of	having	two	such	domains	and	not	merely	 a	 similarity	 relationship,	 see	 Perelman	 &	 Olbrechts-Tyteca	 (1958,	 p.	502),	Beardsley	(1975,	p.	111),	and	Olmos	(2014).	
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627	6.	Violinist	can	only	survive	if	attached	to	person	for	nine	months.	7.	Person	can	make	a	choice	about	removing	violinist…		1.	Woman	who	has	been	raped	finds	herself	pregnant.	2.	Woman	had	no	choice	about	becoming	pregnant.	3.	Being	pregnant	is	an	encumbrance	to	woman.	4.	Being	pregnant	will	hinder	woman’s	daily	activities.	5.	Fetus	will	die	if	removed	from	woman.	6.	Fetus	can	only	survive	if	carried	to	term	of	approximately	nine	months.	7.	Woman	can	make	a	choice	about	removing	fetus.		Thomson	develops	this	analogy	in	different	directions	during	the	course	of	her	paper,	exhibiting	 its	plasticity	and	depth.	 Indeed,	 the	power	and	cogency	of	her	essay	derives	from	its	being	a	good	analogical	argument,	but	 not	 from	 any	 embedded	 fictional	 narrative	 being	 believable	 like	 a	novel,	play,	or	short	story.	As	with	other	such	thought	experiments,	her	violinist	 story	 is	weak	on	both	 external	 and	 internal	 coherence,	 and	 it	would	 be	 astonishing	 if	 it	 were	 even	 intended	 to	 be	 believable.	 As	Peijenburg	 &	 Atkins	 say,	 these	 are	 “outlandish	 stories,”	 	 even	“grotesque”;	 “ones	 like	 Jackson,	 Searle	 and	Putnam	do	not	 eschew	 the	most	bizarre	accounts	of	zombies,	swapped	brains,	exact	Doppelgänger,	and	 famous	 violinists	 who	 are	 plugged	 into	 another	 body”	 (2003,	 p.	305).	 Walton	 too,	 allows	 that	 Thomson’s	 violinist’s	 story	 is	 only	“something	that	could	conceivably	happen”	(2012,	p.	200).		6.	ANECDOTAL	AND	OTHER	NONFICTIONAL	ARGUMENTS		Finally,	 rounding	 out	 the	 consideration	 of	 argumentatively	 evil	storytelling	and	bringing	the	preceding	into	sharper	focus	are	so-called	“anecdotal	 arguments”	 and	 the	 possibilities	 they	 furnish,	 perhaps	notably	to	politicians.	Similarly	to	Johnson	&	Blair	(2006,	p.	70),	Govier	&	Jansen	(2011,	p.	86)	concluded	that	“anecdotal	arguments	are	bound	to	be	logically	and	dialectically	inadequate	if,	as	is	usual,	we	define	them	as	asking	the	audience	to	shift	from	acceptance	of	a	particular	narrative	to	a	general	claim	about	the	world.”	However,	to	the	extent	that	the	term	‘anecdote’	 connotes	 that	 the	 narrative	 is	 nonfictional,	 such	 narratives	differ	 from	 the	 kinds	 of	 narratives	 considered	 thus	 far.	 Unlike	 for	extended	 pieces	 of	 storytelling	 such	 as	 plays	 and	 novels,	 the	 actual	anecdote	in	an	anecdotal	argument	cannot	itself	 furnish	any	argument.	This	 is	 because,	 by	 definition,	 the	 point	 of	 nonfictional	 narration	 (cf.	history	 or	 biography)	 involves	 veracity—sticking	 to	 the	 facts,	 telling	what	happened—so	there	 is	no	theoretical	room	for	the	creativity	that	
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629	7.	CONCLUSION		In	 summary,	 it	 seems	 that	 there	 are	 reasons	 to	 hold	 that	 in	 fictional	narrative	the	potential	for	argumentative	evil	is	greatest	if	the	approach	taken	 is	 “hit	 and	 run,”	 so	 to	 speak,	 whereas	 in	 other	 argumentative	contexts,	 length	 generally	 appears	 to	make	 no	 comparable	 difference.	This	is	a	feature	that	distinguishes	fictional	narrative	arguments.			ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS:	I	am	grateful	to	Jason	Dickenson,	Trudy	Govier,	Lyra	Hostetter,	Kenneth	Olson,	and	Teresa	Plumer	for	helpful	comments	on	an	earlier	draft.			REFERENCES		Beardsley,	 M.	 C.	 (1975).	 Thinking	 straight.	 Principles	 of	 reasoning	 for	 readers	
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633	offer	good	enough	reasons	to	support	the	generalizations	they	seem	to	support.	My	point	 is	 that	 it	depends	on	what	you	are	going	to	use	those	
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